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Notes 
A NEW TAKE ON PUBLIC USE: WERE KELO 
AND LINGLE NONJUSTICIABLE? 
DAVID L. BREAU 
The blinding light of familiarity seems to obscure from observation 
the details of what goes on beneath it. 
—Robert L. Hale1 
INTRODUCTION 
When Suzette Kelo sued to prevent New London, Connecticut, 
from using eminent domain to acquire her home, the Court would 
have been consistent with its standing jurisprudence if it had 
dismissed the case for lack of standing. Suzette Kelo was the named 
plaintiff in Kelo v. City of New London,2 a 2005 takings decision that 
generated significant criticism nationwide3 when the Supreme Court 
ruled that New London could use eminent domain to force the sale of 
 
Copyright © 2006 by David L. Breau. 
 1. Our Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 576 (1939). 
 2. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Editorial, Eminent Injustice in New London, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 26, 2005, at D11 (“These five justices, . . . I hope someone looks at their property and says, 
‘You know, we could put that land to better use—why don’t we get the town to take it from 
them by eminent domain.’ Then maybe they would understand what they’re putting my father 
through.” (quoting Mike Cristofaro, son of one of the Kelo plaintiffs)); T.R. Reid, Missouri 
Condemnation No Longer So Imminent; Supreme Court Ruling Ignites Political Backlash, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A2 (“[A]ll over the country, [Kelo] has sparked a furious 
reaction, with politicians of both parties proposing new legislation that would sharply limit the 
kind of seizure the . . . decision validated.”); Benjamin Weyl, Activist Tries a Grab for Jurist’s 
Property; A Foe of the High Court’s Ruling Wants to Apply It to Seize David H. Souter’s Home, 
L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at A10 (describing an activist’s apparently serious suggestion that the 
city of Weare, New Hampshire, use eminent domain to acquire Justice Souter’s vacation home 
in order to build a new hotel). 
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homes from residents who had lived in them for decades.4 Although 
the Court’s standing jurisprudence, when taken at face value, suggests 
that the homeowners in Kelo may not have had standing to sue,5 the 
Court never considered that possibility because of an assumption that 
claims based upon private property interests are more suitable for 
judicial resolution than less traditional claims that often must 
overcome significant justiciability hurdles before being addressed on 
the merits.6 
The ban on citizen suits prevents federal courts from hearing 
cases in which a plaintiff seeks to vindicate “the right, possessed by 
every citizen, to require that the [g]overnment be administered 
according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted.”7 
Consequently, a suit by a citizen seeking an injunction against a city 
planning a downtown redevelopment project would be dismissed if 
the sole grounds for suit were that the plan would not actually create 
jobs or increase tax revenue.8 Of course, the Kelo plaintiffs were not 
merely concerned citizens—they were losing their homes.9 Rather 
than accept the city’s offer to pay the just compensation required by 
the Takings Clause,10 the Kelo plaintiffs sought to enjoin the taking of 
their property on the ground that it failed to satisfy the Fifth 
 
 4. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 5. Kelo was an appeal from Connecticut’s Supreme Court, and although state courts may 
hear cases that do not qualify as Article III cases or controversies, the Supreme Court must 
nevertheless ascertain a litigant’s standing in a case that arises from state court. See Sec’y of 
State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954–55 & n.4 (1984) (noting that the 
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to hear cases arising from state court that do not 
satisfy Article III standing requirements); see also U. S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 
721 n.** (1990) (following “longstanding precedent in ascertaining the third-party standing of a 
respondent in a case arising from state court”). 
 6. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 7. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (noting that “although a suitor may derive great comfort 
and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated . . . or that the [n]ation’s 
laws are faithfully enforced,” that interest cannot be vindicated in federal court). 
 8. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (“[A taxpayer’s] interest in the 
moneys of the Treasury . . . realized from taxation . . . is shared with millions of others; is 
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment 
out of the funds, [is] so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal 
to the preventive powers of a court . . . .”). 
 9. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 10. In fact, many of the residents in the neighborhood that would be used for the 
redevelopment plan had willingly sold their homes to the city. Id. at 2658. 
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Amendment’s requirement that a taking be “for public use.”11 Among 
other things, they argued that the taking of their properties would not 
result in any public benefit because the development plan was 
unlikely to create jobs or increase tax revenue, as the city claimed.12 
Although the Kelo homeowners would be injured if they were 
forced to sell their homes,13 those injuries would exist regardless of 
whether the redevelopment plan succeeded wildly or failed miserably. 
Suppose that city planners had decided that the New London 
waterfront would be an ideal location for a sports stadium or another 
clearly public facility.14 In such a case, the impact on waterfront 
property owners would be identical—they would be forced to 
exchange their homes for just compensation—but they would be 
unable to sue to enjoin the takings on a public use ground.15 Put 
another way, the use to which taken property is put is unrelated to the 
injury, and consequently to the rights, of its former private owners. In 
this light, the plaintiffs in Kelo are no more harmed by a failure to 
comply with the Public Use Clause than is any other citizen with an 
interest “that the [g]overnment be administered according to law.”16 
Similarly, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,17 a regulatory takings 
case argued the same day as Kelo, could have been dismissed for lack 
of standing. In Lingle, the Chevron Corporation challenged an act 
passed by the Hawaii legislature that capped the rent that oil 
 
 11. Id. at 2666–67. The Takings Clause states in its entirety, “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 13. See id. at 2668 (“[W]e do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, 
notwithstanding the payment of just compensation.”). 
 14. See id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sovereign may transfer private 
property to private parties . . . who make the property available for the public’s use—such as 
with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium.”). 
 15. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“Equitable relief is not 
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, 
when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign . . . .” (footnote omitted)); id. 
at 1018 n.21 (“To the extent that the operation of the statute provides compensation, no taking 
has occurred and the [property owner] has no claim against the Government.”); see also First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987) (“[The 
Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private property, . . . but rather . . . secure[s] 
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” (citations 
omitted)); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (“The rights of these property owners are 
satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the 
price of the taking.”). 
 16. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922). To be clear, the argument that public use 
claims are nonjusticiable was as plausible before Kelo was decided as afterwards. 
 17. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005). 
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companies could charge gasoline dealers who lease company service 
stations.18 The legislature hoped that the act would encourage dealers 
to lower retail gasoline prices,19 but Chevron argued the act was so 
economically unsound that it could even cause an increase, rather 
than a decrease, in prices at the pump.20 Chevron claimed that 
because the act was unlikely to actually benefit the public, it violated 
the Public Use Clause and should be enjoined as an unconstitutional 
regulatory taking.21 
The ban on citizen suits would prevent an unhappy consumer 
from suing to enjoin a state’s price-control regulation on the ground 
that the regulation’s economics would be unlikely to actually lower 
prices.22 Suppose that another state had enacted a gasoline-price 
regulation that capped wholesale prices directly and actually lowered 
the cost for consumers. Gasoline companies such as Chevron would 
be identically injured by such a regulation but could not prevail on a 
takings claim.23 The Lingle Court acknowledged as much in its 
holding—on the merits—that the Takings Clause provided no basis to 
invalidate the Hawaii rent cap. Justice O’Connor, writing for a 
unanimous Court, explained that a regulation’s effectiveness is 
irrelevant for determining whether it results in an unconstitutional 
taking: 
 
 18. Id. at 2079. 
 19. Id. at 2078–79. 
 20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (D. Haw. 2002), aff’d sub 
nom. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Lingle, 125 S. 
Ct. at 2074. 
 21. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079. 
 22. Cf. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922) (“Plaintiff has only the right, 
possessed by every citizen, to require . . . that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this 
general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute [a suit] in the federal courts.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516–18 (1944) (explaining that 
price-control regulations do not violate the Takings Clause); see also, e.g., FCC v. Fla. Power 
Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (“[S]tatutes regulating the economic relations of landlords and 
tenants are not per se takings.”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 440 (1982) (“States have broad power to regulate . . . the landlord-tenant relationship . . . 
without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails.”); Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 582 (1942) (“The authority of 
Congress to regulate the prices of commodities in interstate commerce is at least as great under 
the Fifth Amendment as is that of the States under the Fourteenth to regulate the prices of 
commodities in intrastate commerce.”); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (holding that a 
rent control ordinance was not a compensable taking); cf. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing 
Se., Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 215 (1991) (noting that Congress has 
authority to set “just and reasonable” rates for natural gas); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope 
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944) (same). 
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The owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively 
serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just 
as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an ineffective 
regulation. It would make little sense to say that the second owner 
has suffered a taking while the first has not.24 
In other words, the constitutional infirmity—potential failure to 
benefit the public—did not cause Chevron’s harm.25 As such, 
Chevron’s interest in effective gas-price control is no greater than, 
and is perhaps even less than,26 that of any other Hawaii gasoline 
consumer.27 
 
 24. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084. 
 25. See id. (“[A]n ineffective regulation may not significantly burden property rights at all, 
and it may distribute any burden broadly and evenly . . . . The notion that such a regulation 
nevertheless ‘takes’ private property . . . merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is 
untenable.”); see also id. at 2083–84 (“[W]hether a regulation of private property is effective in 
achieving some legitimate public purpose . . . reveals nothing about the magnitude or character 
of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights.”). In Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Court suggested that a regulation was an unconstitutional 
taking solely because it did not “substantially advance legitimate state interests.” Id. at 260. 
Lingle overruled this aspect of Agins, noting that its language there had been “regrettably 
imprecise.” 125 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 26. The interests of Hawaii gasoline consumers in affordable gasoline directly conflict with 
Chevron’s interest in maximizing its profits from selling gasoline, and decoupling Chevron’s 
injury from the failure to benefit the public by lower gas prices exposes the inherent conflict of 
interest that exists in suits to enjoin takings on a public use ground. See infra notes 141–43 and 
accompanying text. When Chevron raised the claims of Hawaii gasoline consumers as the basis 
for enjoining the Hawaii rent cap, it was, in effect, basing its claim for relief on the interests of 
third parties not before the Court. In other contexts, such cases have been dismissed under the 
Court’s third-party standing doctrine. See infra Part II. 
 27. The ban on citizen suits is generally, though not always, considered to be a prudential 
standing limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 524 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); see also infra note 125. However, the plaintiffs’ suits in Lingle 
and Kelo could be seen as suffering from a constitutional standing infirmity as well—namely, a 
lack of causation. The success or failure of New London’s redevelopment plan has little bearing 
on the Kelo plaintiffs’ injuries. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text. Likewise, the 
effectiveness of the Hawaii rent cap in benefiting consumers in no way causes Chevron’s injury. 
See supra text accompanying notes 22–27. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court 
explained that a “claim of injury cannot support standing [when] the injury alleged is not fairly 
traceable to the government conduct . . . challenge[d] as unlawful,” id. at 757 (emphasis added). 
Such a tight fit between the injury and the allegedly illegal conduct is not always required, 
however. For example, the Court was willing to grant standing to plaintiffs who challenged the 
construction of two nuclear power plants on the ground that “in the event of a nuclear accident 
their property would be ‘taken’ without any assurance of just compensation.” Duke Power Co. 
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 69 (1978). Because a federal statute had 
limited liability for private industry and enabled Duke Power to construct the plants, the Court 
found that the statute was the “but for” cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries and that, as such, the 
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality. Id. at 77. In Kelo and Lingle, 
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Of course, takings claims have long been adjudicated by federal 
courts,28 and it would be preposterous to deny homeowners like those 
in Kelo standing to sue to enjoin the forced sale of their homes—an 
injury if there ever were one.29 The intention of this Note is not to 
argue that Kelo and Lingle should have been dismissed as 
nonjusticiable—that would have been an unnecessarily radical 
departure from the Court’s takings jurisprudence, not to mention 
politically unwise for the Court.30 Nor does this Note seek to reclassify 
these cases as standing decisions in disguise—they clearly are not. 
Rather, this Note highlights the tension between the Public Use line 
of takings decisions and the Court’s standing jurisprudence, namely, 
that a consistent application of standing doctrines to future takings 
cases with facts similar to those in Kelo and Lingle could lead to 
surprising outcomes. Surprising because, although the Framers 
probably did not intend the Constitution to enshrine liberal 
natural-rights ideology to the exclusion of all else,31 protecting private 
 
too, the taking of the plaintiffs’ property was the “but for” cause of the injuries to the plaintiff. 
In each case, however, the “conduct challenged as unlawful” was not the taking itself but the 
government’s use of the property once taken. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 
(2005); Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079. As such, the injury to the plaintiffs was not “fairly traceable” 
to that conduct—i.e., the failure to use the taken property for the public—and, consequently, 
the element of causation necessary for Article III standing was absent. 
 28. See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 533–34 (1848) (adjudicating 
a takings claim). 
 29. One of the plaintiffs had lived in her house since her birth in 1918; she had lived there 
with her husband since they were married in the 1940s. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. Suzette Kelo 
had “made extensive improvements to her house, which she prize[d] for its water view.” Id. 
 30. One can only imagine the reaction if the Court were to duck the issue on procedural 
grounds, given the uproar that followed the Kelo decision on the merits. See, e.g., Timothy 
Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of War over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A1 
(describing the “storm of legislative action and protest” in the wake of Kelo). 
 31. “The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting 
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690); see 
also DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 15 (1992) 
(explaining that for Locke, “[p]roperty was a general political term referring to all the personal 
and political rights of individuals”). 
There is an ongoing debate about the relative importance to the Founders of Lockean 
liberalism on the one hand and of republican government ideals on the other. SCHULTZ, supra, 
at 11–13. For those who emphasize the Lockean influence, “[t]he hallmark of liberal 
constitutionalism is a vision of law and society emphasizing a harsh, overarching separation of 
the private and the public, the individual and the state.” WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 21 (1996). For 
example, Professor Richard Epstein views the Takings Clause as the constitutional embodiment 
of a strict natural-rights theory of property in the tradition of Locke, which, according to 
Epstein, requires the government to make a property owner “whole” when it acts in any way 
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property from arbitrary government interference was surely one of 
their main objectives,32 either as an end in-and-of itself33 or as a means 
to the end of securing individual liberty.34 
Courts are unlikely even to suggest that standing may be an issue 
in cases such as Kelo and Lingle,35 not because such a suggestion is 
doctrinally untenable, but because of an often-unstated assumption 
that the individual right to private property asserted in such takings 
 
that limits the owner’s property rights. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 52–53, 57–92 (1985). 
Others counter that history does not support this view, characterizing it as the product of the 
misconceptions of “property-minded advocates of minimalism [who] all too often portray the 
nineteenth century’s constitutional doctrines as having religiously fostered . . . sweeping 
protection to private rights in property as a matter of fundamental law.” Harry N. Scheiber, The 
Jurisprudence—and Mythology—of Eminent Domain in American Legal History, in LIBERTY, 
PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 
217, 218 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989). Scheiber contends that “[t]he 
history of our eminent domain law has been one of tension between economic individualism and 
community values,” id. at 231, and that “[early American] judges gave a good deal of sustained 
attention to producing a theory of ‘public rights’ . . . [to balance] against constitutional mandates 
for the protection of private [property] rights,” id. at 218. Novak explains that the common law 
principle of salus populi suprema lex est (the welfare of the people is the supreme law)—in other 
words, the supremacy of the public interest—was at least as important a limit on private 
property rights in the early days of the United States as its perhaps better-known cousin, sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own so as not to injure another). NOVAK, supra, at 35–
50; see also SCHULTZ, supra, at 21 (“[T]he founders . . . realized that at times property might 
have to be limited for public necessity.”); cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 64 (1977) (noting that as late as 1800, “there still existed a 
perhaps dominant body of opinion maintaining that individuals held their property at the 
sufferance of the state”). 
 32. “[T]he right to acquire and own property was undoubtedly a paramount value for the 
framers of the Constitution.” JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (1992); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 1, at 36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (recommending adoption of the 
Constitution because of the protection it “afford[s] to the preservation of [republican] 
government, to liberty, and to property” (emphasis omitted)); see also infra notes 105–06. 
 33. Justice Patterson spoke for many of the Founders when he described property as a 
“natural, inherent, and unalienable right[]” and explained that “[t]he preservation of 
property . . . is a primary object of the social compact.” Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). 
 34. Thomas Jefferson and other early Republicans had a functional view of property rights 
that differed from Lockean conceptions of property. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, 
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 27–37 (1997) (“Jefferson’s doctrine asserts . . . the social character of 
property rights . . . . Property was valued not as an end in itself but as a foundation for 
republican government.”); see also ELY, supra note 32, at 43 (explaining that “the framers saw 
property ownership as a buffer protecting individuals from governmental coercion”). 
 35. Justice Blackmun was willing to suggest such a possibility in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1043 n.5 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 
151–58 and accompanying text. 
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cases is more valuable than the public interest.36 Courts “assume that 
the core values, which the individual interest asserts, are 
presumptively superior to the core values that the competing public 
interest involves.”37 Many standing doctrines have evolved to keep 
ideologically driven plaintiffs out of court.38 If it is true, however, that 
habit and history rather than principled legal reasoning prevent these 
doctrines from being applied in cases such as Kelo and Lingle,39 then 
perhaps their application in other contexts ought to be questioned as 
well. Part I examines the similarities between the Court’s respective 
interpretations of the condition that a taking be “for public use” and 
the condition that Congress exercise its taxing power “for the general 
welfare.” Part I also explores whether the effective nonjusticiability of 
the latter has implications for the former. Part II returns to, and 
elaborates on, the standing issues lurking within Kelo and Lingle and 
questions why those issues are raised in some types of cases—for 
example, environmental suits—but not in cases that concern 
traditional property rights. 
I.  “FOR PUBLIC USE” IS “FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE” 
Kelo reaffirmed “the broader and more natural interpretation of 
public use as ‘public purpose’”40 and upheld a city’s use of eminent 
domain to acquire homeowners’ property for a downtown economic 
redevelopment plan because “that plan unquestionably serve[d] a 
public purpose.”41 Justice Thomas dissented because, in his view, the 
“most natural reading” of the Public Use Clause requires “either the 
government or its citizens as a whole [to] actually ‘employ’ the taken 
property.”42 In addition to supporting his position with various 
Founding-era documents,43 Justice Thomas drew a comparison from 
 
 36. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 156 
(2003). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See infra notes 145–46, 164–66 and accompanying text. 
 39. Cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 1 (1990) (“The 
Framers’ preoccupation with property generated a shallow conception of democracy and a 
system of institutions that allocates political power unequally and fails to foster political 
participation.”). 
 40. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005). 
 41. Id. at 2665. 
 42. Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 43. See, e.g., id. (citing a 1773 dictionary for the definition of “use”). 
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language in the Constitution itself. He noted that “the phrase ‘public 
use’ contrasts with the very different phrase ‘general Welfare’ used 
elsewhere in the Constitution.”44 Accordingly, he explained, “The 
Framers would have used some such broader term if they had meant 
the Public Use Clause to have a similarly sweeping scope.”45 
The “sweeping scope” to which Justice Thomas referred is “the 
wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress”46 concerning its 
power under Article I “[t]o lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts 
and provide for the . . . general Welfare.”47 The Court has repeatedly 
explained that “[t]he discretion . . . is not confided to the courts” to 
decide “between one welfare and another, between particular and 
general,”48 and “[w]hether the chosen means appear bad, unwise, or 
unworkable to [the Court] is irrelevant.”49 Unless there is “no 
reasonable possibility [that] the challenged legislation fall[s] within 
the wide range of discretion permitted to . . . Congress,”50 the Court 
will not scrutinize the decision “unless the choice is clearly wrong, a 
display of arbitrary power, [and] not an exercise of judgment.”51 This 
level of deference to Congress is such that the Court has “questioned 
whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at 
all,”52 and commentators have described the condition as “effectively 
nonjusticiable.”53 
If “public use” means actual use by the public, as Justice Thomas 
would prefer, then that question would certainly be amenable to a 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2680. 
 46. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 48. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 
(1976) (per curiam) (“Congress has concluded that the means are ‘necessary and proper’ to 
promote the general welfare, and we thus decline to find this legislation without the grant of 
power in Art[icle] I, § 8.”). 
 49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91 (quotations omitted). 
 50. Butler, 297 U.S. at 67. 
 51. Davis, 301 U.S. at 640. 
 52. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987). 
 53. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 
197 (2001); see David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1197, 1200 (2004) (“Dole’s requirement that spending programs serve the ‘general welfare’ 
is, by the Court’s own admission, nonjusticiable.”); Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to 
Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 
37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2004) (“There is no justiciable limit on the expenditure of funds . . . 
for ‘the General Welfare.’”). 
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judicial determination. Currently, however, a taking is for public use 
as long as it “serves a public purpose.”54 For physical takings, at least 
five Justices are unwilling to engage in any means-ends analysis,55 and 
for regulatory takings, the Lingle Court unanimously agreed that the 
Public Use Clause does not license courts to scrutinize a regulation’s 
effectiveness in achieving its stated public purpose.56 Rather, such 
heightened scrutiny would “present serious practical difficulties” and 
is “a task for which courts are not well suited.”57 But once public use 
is understood to mean “public purpose” and is satisfied by a 
legislature’s “not irrational” determination that a taking is for public 
use,58 the level of scrutiny that applies is similar to that which applies 
in general welfare cases. Perhaps, then, the Public Use Clause could 
fairly be described as what it appears to be—effectively 
nonjusticiable. 
The nonjusticiability59 of the General Welfare Clause is 
consistent with the prudential limitation on citizens’ ability to sue for 
general violations of the taxing and spending powers.60 Taxpayers are 
usually unable to sue the government for injunctive relief on the 
grounds that an alleged taxing and spending violation will increase 
 
 54. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005). 
 55. See id. at 2667–68 (upholding a legislature’s “not irrational” public use determination, 
and comparing that result to Lingle). 
 56. Although Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist are no longer on the Court, 
this is unlikely to change significantly the Court’s direction on these issues in the near future. 
Because the decision in Lingle was unanimous, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2077 (2005), it is unlikely that 
their replacements will impact the Court’s position on this issue. Kelo was a 5–4 decision, but 
neither Justice O’Connor nor Chief Justice Rehnquist were in the majority. 125 S. Ct. at 2658. 
 57. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084–85; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]ourts are ill-equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative initiatives.”). 
 58. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665, 2667. 
 59. There appears to be a slight distinction between “effective” nonjusticiability and actual 
nonjusticiability. The Court’s description of its role in General Welfare Clause challenges is that 
it will decline to decide them unless there is “no reasonable possibility” that the challenged 
conduct is within the scope of Congress’s powers. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936). 
A case that is actually nonjusticiable, however, cannot be adjudicated even if there is no 
reasonable possibility that the government could act as it did. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph 
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954 n.4 (1984) (noting that standing is a jurisdictional 
requirement). The General Welfare Clause might be described as subject to review more 
deferential than even rational basis review, rather than as nonjusticiable in the Article III sense. 
Regardless, the point is that commentators, and even the Court itself, have no qualms about 
labeling the General Welfare Clause nonjusticiable, while declining to describe the Public Use 
Clause in the same terms. 
 60. Baker, supra note 53, at 197. 
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their tax burden.61 Such suits are nonjusticiable because the grievance 
is a generalized one—a taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the 
Treasury . . . is shared with millions of others . . . and the effect upon 
future taxation, of any payment out of the funds [is] so remote, 
fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to 
the preventive powers of a court.”62 Although taxpayer suits are 
dismissed because the Taxing and Spending Clause does not give rise 
to an individual right to seek a judicial remedy, courts are also 
disinclined to adjudicate such claims because they perceive 
themselves to be ill equipped to decide issues in which matters of 
public concern outweigh matters of individual concern.63 
The Takings Clause, by contrast, often has been understood as 
granting an individual right to enjoin the government from taking 
property when not for a public use,64 as if that clause in fact stated 
“Private property shall not be taken except for public use, nor without 
just compensation.”65 The condition that a taking be for public use has 
 
 61. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
101 (1968) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge an expenditure that allegedly violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). Although later plaintiffs sought to extend Flast 
to allow taxpayer standing when a tax or expenditure violated other parts of the Constitution, 
the Court has consistently limited Flast to Establishment Clause violations. ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (2d ed. 2002). 
 62. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 487. 
 63. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896 (1983) (noting that courts “have in a way been 
specifically designed to be bad at [protecting rights that can be vindicated through the 
democratic process]”); cf. Flast, 392 U.S. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It seems . . . clear that 
public actions, whatever the constitutional provisions on which they are premised, may involve 
important hazards for the continued effectiveness of the federal judiciary.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930) (“[T]he question what is a public 
use is a judicial one.”), quoted in Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also SCHULTZ, supra note 31, at 28 (describing an 1837 New 
York case that “represented one of the first state cases where the judiciary failed to defer to a 
legislature” about a determination that a taking was for public use). 
 65. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES, 
at II (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888). Although the Takings Clause does not expressly forbid 
takings for private use, “the courts have universally read [the Takings Clause] as a proscription 
against takings for a private purpose.” Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in 
Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 205 (1977). From the text itself, it is “questionable” 
whether the Public Use Clause was intended as a limitation at all. 
If the intent had been to make the words, public use, a limitation, the natural form of 
the expression would have been: “Private property shall not be taken except for 
public use, nor without just compensation.” It is certainly questionable whether 
anything more was intended by the provision . . . than as though it read, “Private 
property shall not be taken under the power of eminent domain without just 
compensation.” 
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been considered part of the individual cause of action created by the 
Takings Clause as a whole.66 Accordingly, whereas the Court’s review 
of general welfare under a “no reasonable possibility” standard67 has 
led to viewing that condition as nonjusticiable,68 the Court’s review of 
public use under a “not irrational” standard69 has led to a different 
assessment.70 Because the Takings Clause (as part of the Bill of 
Rights) creates an individual right while the Taxing and Spending 
Clause (as part of Article I’s delegation of powers to Congress) does 
not, the Court and commentators reasonably describe public use 
 
LEWIS, supra. 
 66. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost 
Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1161 (2005) (“If the government is 
otherwise acting within the bounds of its authority, it cannot be enjoined from seizing property 
under the clause, but it can be ordered to pay judicially determined ‘just compensation’ after the 
fact. . . . By negative implication, when a taking is not for a ‘public use,’ the owner can enjoin 
it . . . .” (emphasis added)); Thomas E. Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A 
Procedural Loose End, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 623, 626 (2002) (“[C]ourts disregard the fact that 
the remedy for a taking is compensation when they freely entertain takings claims that seek 
injunctive relief.”). 
The Court has expanded this cause of action beyond the Framers’ intentions. Specifically, 
regulatory takings did not exist before Justice Holmes’s famous “too far” formulation in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). The general consensus is that the 
drafters of the Fifth Amendment did not consider government regulation to fall within the 
purview of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding 
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791 (1995) (claiming 
that the Fifth Amendment was originally interpreted to require compensation “when the 
government physically took property”); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1057 n.23 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“James Madison, author of the Takings Clause, 
apparently intended it to apply only to direct, physical takings of property . . . .”); id. at 1028 
n.15 (majority opinion) (“Justice B[lackmun] is correct that early constitutional theorists did not 
believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all . . . .”). 
Changing conceptions of property may have influenced the development of the 
regulatory takings doctrine. “Under the classical conception, actual dispossession was required 
before ownership rights were violated and property was taken. By contrast, . . . modern legal 
scholars . . . see property in resources as consisting of the infinitely divisible claims to possession, 
use, disposition, and profit that people might have with respect to those things.” Thomas C. 
Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 30 (1986) (footnote omitted). 
 67. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 68. Baker, supra note 53, at 197; Engstrom, supra note 53, at 1200; Galle, supra note 53, at 
161. 
 69. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 70. See id. at 2668 (“[The] Court’s authority . . . extends . . . to determining whether . . . 
proposed condemnations are for a ‘public use’ . . . .”). Regarding decisions such as Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), one commentator has noted that “court cases 
appear . . . to have made [public use] determinations political questions for legislatures,” 
SCHULTZ, supra note 31, at 73 (emphasis added). This comment was more a description of the 
chances of mounting a successful public use challenge rather than an assessment that the Court 
had subsumed the public use inquiry into the political question doctrine. 
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cases as decided on the merits—albeit under a weak rational basis 
standard—while at the same time apply the label nonjusticiable to 
General Welfare Clause challenges.71 
Nonetheless, this disparity of terminology seems incorrect after 
Kelo and Lingle, which together stand for the proposition that a 
takings challenge can rarely, if ever, succeed when predicated solely 
on an allegation that the taken property will not sufficiently benefit 
the public.72 Kelo and Lingle do not foreclose plaintiffs’ ability to 
challenge conduct as a taking even when the government believes it is 
not,73 and private property owners can, of course, still seek just 
compensation for takings.74 But public use challenges are in a separate 
category. The Court tepidly suggested that it would still police 
extreme abuses of power in this regard,75 possibly under the Due 
Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause,76 but in general, “the 
 
 71. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 (“[E]mpirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no 
less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be 
carried out in the federal courts.”), and id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This deferential 
standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.” (citation omitted)), with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) (“The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the 
Court has . . . questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at 
all.”). 
 72. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2005) (“Whatever the merits 
of [Chevron’s claim that Hawaii’s rent cap will not serve the legitimate public purpose of 
controlling retail gas prices], it does not sound under the Takings Clause.”); cf. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 
at 2664 (“‘[I]t is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics’ . . . that matters in determining 
public use.” (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)); id. at 2671 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of “effectively . . . delet[ing] the words ‘for public 
use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). 
 73. In many cases, a suit that seeks to classify governmental conduct as a taking is the 
effective equivalent to a suit for injunctive relief because, if successful, the government will be 
unwilling or unable to pay the just compensation and will instead pursue a different course of 
conduct. As such, plaintiffs can still prevent the government from taking their property in many 
instances. 
 74. But see Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355, 355 
(2005) (“Like all eminent domain cases, the Kelo condemnations raised the typical questions of 
valuation for the property to be taken, where the rules of the game are all rigged in favor of the 
government entity.”). 
 75. The Kelo majority noted that a city “[would not] be allowed to take property under the 
mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.” 125 
S. Ct. at 2661. 
 76. Or, at the very least, the analysis will be identical to that used for due process 
challenges. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]ransfers intended to 
confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual 
public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”), with Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2083 (“[A] 
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or 
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government [can] do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.”77 In 
Lingle, the Court discussed the Public Use Clause in the context of 
regulatory takings and concluded that the question of whether a 
regulation is effective is “logically . . . distinct from the question 
whether a regulation effects a taking.”78 Any sort of heightened 
means-ends review, explained Justice O’Connor, “would empower—
and might often require—courts to substitute their predictive 
judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.”79 
This is “a task for which courts are not well suited,”80 as the Lingle 
lower court proceedings demonstrate.81 Rather, such arguments about 
 
irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”) and id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so 
arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.”). 
 77. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 n.19 (quoting E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)); see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of 
private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be 
brought against the sovereign . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987) (“[The Takings Clause] does 
not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of 
[the] power . . . to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting 
to a taking.” (citations omitted)); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21 (“To the extent that the 
operation of the statute provides compensation, no taking has occurred and the [property 
owner] has no claim against the Government.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (“The 
rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the 
Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.”) . 
 78. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084. 
 79. Id. at 2085. 
 80. Id. Quoting a passage from Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240–41 
(1984), which itself borrowed language from an earlier case, United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 
327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946), Justice O’Connor wrote in her Kelo dissent: 
Because courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative 
initiatives, we rejected as unworkable the idea of courts’ “‘deciding on what is and is 
not a governmental function and . . . invalidating legislation on the basis of their view 
on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable 
in other fields.’” 
125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 81. Each time the district court heard essentially the same evidence from two expert 
economists with opposing views, it reached contradictory conclusions. Compare Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding that if oil 
companies increased wholesale prices to offset the revenue loss caused by the rent cap, service 
station owners would “respond to the increase in the wholesale price by raising retail prices” 
(emphasis added)), with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013 (D. Haw. 
1998) (finding “no economic reason why a shift from paying a certain sum as ‘rent’ to paying 
that same sum as ‘fuel price’ would lead a dealer to react by raising his gas prices when his 
overall costs remain[ed] the same” (emphases added)). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court 
viewed the lower court proceedings as “remarkable, to say the least.” Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2085; 
cf. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 177 (1987) 
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a regulation’s impact “are better directed to Congress” than to the 
courts.82 
The Court’s public use cases in the physical takings context—
exemplified by Berman v. Parker,83 Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff,84 and now Kelo—also accord considerable deference to a 
legislature’s judgment that an exercise of eminent domain is for 
public use.85 These cases have “embraced the broader and more 
natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose,’”86 rather than 
requiring actual use by the public87 or some other intermediate 
interpretation.88 In Kelo, the Court held that because the city’s 
development plan “unquestionably serves a public purpose, the 
takings . . . satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment.”89 Outside an “unusual exercise of government power”90 
in which “the property of A [is taken] for the sole purpose of 
transferring it to another private party B . . . . under the mere pretext 
 
(“Litigation based upon hypothetical possibility rather than concrete fact is apt to be poor 
litigation.”). 
 82. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015 n.18. 
 83. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 84. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 85. Whether Kelo is an extension of the Court’s prior cases concerning the appropriate 
level of deference to a legislature’s determination of public use is the crux of the disagreement 
between the majority and the dissent. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663–66 (discussing Berman, 
348 U.S. at 26, and Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 229, and holding that there is “no principled 
way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes” recognized in 
those cases), with id. at 2673–75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s holding 
abandons its role “in reviewing a legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use . . . 
[though] the Court in Berman made clear that it is ‘an extremely narrow’ one.” (quoting Haw. 
Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240 (alteration and omission in original))), and id. at 2675 (“[T]he 
Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use.”). 
 86. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662. 
 87. See, e.g., id. at 2681–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court’s early public 
use decisions as requiring “the government or the public [to] actually use[] the taken property”). 
 88. Justice O’Connor would read the Public Use Clause as a limitation requiring that the 
“precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society.” Id. at 
2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In Justice O’Connor’s view, Berman and Hawaii Housing 
Authority stand for the proposition that a valid public benefit can accrue when the taking of 
property itself eliminates a public harm. Id. This approach would partially undermine the 
argument that public use plaintiffs could be denied standing because the conduct that causes the 
harm—the taking of property—is the same conduct that causes the public benefit. 
 89. Id. at 2665. 
 90. Id. at 2667. 
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of a public purpose,”91 federal courts will not second guess a 
legislature’s use of eminent domain.92 
Once public use is equated with “public purpose,” the condition 
that a taking be “for public use” begins to sound quite similar to the 
condition that a tax or expenditure be “for the general welfare.”93 In 
fact, the General Welfare Clause itself has been described as “[t]he 
power of Congress to authorize [an] expenditure of public moneys for 
public purposes.”94 The Court will not review a congressional exercise 
of that power unless there is “no reasonable possibility” that a tax or 
expenditure is for the general welfare.95 Likewise, as long as a 
legislature’s public use determination is “not irrational,” the Public 
Use Clause cannot be used to enjoin a taking.96 As the Court has 
indicated, “[w]hen the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its 
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates 
 
 91. Id. at 2661. An early Supreme Court case listed several hypothetical examples of 
obviously invalid laws, one of which was “a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.” 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). This case has been employed as a rhetorical 
flourish by all sides in the public use debate. Compare Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 & n.5 (quoting 
Calder to support the idea that New London “would no doubt be forbidden from taking 
petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party”), 
with id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder to emphasize that Kelo “abandons 
this long-held, basic limitation on government power”), and id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Calder to support the argument that “[t]he Public Use Clause . . . embodied the 
Framers’ understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the 
government from ‘tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B’”). 
 92. Id. at 2667. The role that the Court has carved out for itself in public use cases is “‘an 
extremely narrow’ one,” Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (quoting 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)), and, contrary to the conventional wisdom, appears to 
be present in general welfare cases as well. The Court will invalidate a taking if the legislature’s 
public use determination is “irrational,” cf. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667, just as a tax will be 
invalidated if there is “no reasonable possibility” that it serves the general welfare, United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936). See also supra note 59. Interestingly, the Kelo majority 
implicitly compared its deferential approach to the deference accorded to the legislature in 
matters of taxation. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 n.18 (“The power to tax is not the power to 
destroy while this Court sits.” (quoting Panhandle Oil Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 
223 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
 93. This is the inverse of the comparison made by Justice Thomas in his Kelo dissent. See 
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Tellingly, the phrase ‘public use’ contrasts 
with the very different phrase ‘general Welfare’ used elsewhere in the Constitution.”); see also 
supra notes 42–53 and accompanying text. 
 94. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)). 
 95. Butler, 297 U.S. at 67. 
 96. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667. 
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over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal 
courts.”97 
Just as an otherwise valid regulation is not an unconstitutional 
taking “merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness,”98 valid 
taxes and expenditures do not violate the General Welfare Clause 
because they may be “bad, unwise, or unworkable.”99 To be sure, “a 
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective 
may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process 
Clause,”100 and a violation of the General Welfare Clause that is “a 
display of arbitrary power” may likewise violate other constitutional 
provisions.101 But the idea that legislatures are better suited than 
courts to decide if a particular course of conduct is for a public 
purpose would seem to be true whether that decision is made in the 
context of the power to tax and spend102 or the power to take private 
property in exchange for just compensation.103 When public use is 
defined broadly as public purpose, little distinction remains between 
the Court’s role in adjudicating the condition that a taking be “for 
public use” and the condition that a tax or expenditure be “for the 
general welfare.” 
Admittedly, the distinction in terminology used to describe these 
two clauses may have little real-world impact—either way, the 
plaintiffs lose. Sometimes, however, semantic differences are useful 
for what they reveal about the underlying conceptual framework that 
produced those differences.104 For centuries, the American 
constitutional tradition sanctified private property as a critical 
mechanism for protecting individual liberty against government 
 
 97. Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43). 
 98. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2005). 
 99. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91 (internal quotations omitted). 
 100. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084. 
 101. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). 
 102. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90 (“It is for Congress to decide which expenditures will 
promote the general welfare.”). 
 103. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2676 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he judiciary cannot get bogged down in predictive judgments about whether the public will 
actually be better off after a property transfer.”). 
 104. Cf. Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock, Introduction to CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 1, 1–4, 7–11 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988) (discussing how “the 
limits and possibilities of . . . language” influenced the way that the drafters of the Constitution 
conveyed the ideas they wanted to embody in it). 
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interference.105 Dean Treanor explains that the Takings Clause was 
included in the Bill of Rights to correct for the failure of the political 
process to protect landowners, an insular minority that James 
Madison considered to be “peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian 
decisionmaking.”106 Treanor argues that when applying the Framers’ 
intent107 to takings in the modern context, courts should only order 
compensation for today’s equivalent of 1791 landowners, that is, 
insular minorities that are particularly unlikely to receive 
compensation through the political process.108 The implication of this 
approach is that court access is unnecessary whenever the political 
process compensates property owners, as it did the plaintiffs in Kelo 
as well as those in other eminent domain cases.109 
 
 105. “The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That 
right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken away 
or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
627 (1885) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817–18 (K.B.)). The 
centrality of property, as expressed in these early cases, is closely connected to the protections 
of individual liberties that the Court developed during the twentieth century. For example, the 
Court has explained the constitutional basis for a fundamental right of privacy by reference to 
the importance of property articulated in Entick and Boyd: 
The principles laid down in this opinion [by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington] 
affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. . . . It is not the breaking 
of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the 
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property . . . . 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 n.* (1965) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (citation 
omitted)). 
 106. Treanor, supra note 66, at 847–48. Although “the framers anticipated that property 
owners would dominate the new government and that such persons could be relied on to respect 
property rights,” Madison nevertheless considered it necessary to ensure that “extended 
representation would diffuse the tendency of majority factions at the state level to oppress the 
minority, particularly property owners.” ELY, supra note 32, at 47–49; see also NEDELSKY, supra 
note 39, at 32 (arguing that Madison thought the “inevitable inequality of property [distribution] 
made [property] particularly vulnerable in a republic” and consequently believed that “the 
protection of property was part of the larger problem of protecting minority rights”). 
 107. For more on “translation” as a method of constitutional interpretation, see generally 
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
 108. See Treanor, supra note 66, at 887 (“Compensation should be mandated only in those 
types of cases where the political process is particularly unlikely to consider property claims 
fairly . . . . Today, the cases in which process failure is most likely involve minority groups . . . 
and the singling out of individuals or small groups of people.”). This was not so in Kelo, given 
that many of the residents affected by the New London redevelopment plan had sold their 
homes to the city voluntarily. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005). Thus, it 
is reasonable to assume that individuals in the position analogous to that of the Kelo plaintiffs 
would not need the courts to obtain compensation. 
 109. “The political process, through which citizens and interest groups lobby for their 
interests to be represented by their legislators, safeguards private property rights, so courts 
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The Court and commentators describe the General Welfare 
Clause, but not the Public Use Clause, as “effectively 
nonjusticiable”110 for the same reason that it sounds radical to argue 
that property owners who can depend on the political process to 
obtain compensation should not have access to the courts. 
Specifically, the rights guaranteed (and, by implication, the powers 
granted) by the Takings Clause are presumed to be essentially private 
and individual, whereas the powers granted (and, by implication, the 
rights guaranteed) by the Taxing and Spending Clause are presumed 
to be essentially public. But Treanor’s argument and the similarities 
between the Public Use Clause and the General Welfare Clause both 
undermine this assumption that the Takings Clause in general, and 
the Public Use Clause in particular, necessarily provides a private 
judicial remedy. Part II questions the assumption of a judicial remedy 
even further by highlighting the doctrinal inconsistency between cases 
that describe the scope of standing—often cases in which an 
individual seeks to vindicate an environmental damage claim111 or 
other “public” interest112—and cases such as Kelo and Lingle, which 
rarely mention standing but share many characteristics with cases that 
do. 
 
should defer to legislative determinations of public use.” Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking 
New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 
1855 (2005) (footnote omitted). For example, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
229 (1984), the state legislature’s plan to break up the state’s system of highly concentrated land 
ownership provided compensation to landowners whose land would be taken, id. at 232–34. 
 110. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in Environmental Suits and 
the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 27, 27 (2003) (“[S]tanding . . . is often a major [issue 
in the] numerous actions brought by concerned citizens and environmental advocacy 
organizations to . . . enjoin harmful activities.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209–11, 220–
21 (1974) (finding that plaintiffs who sought to enjoin members of Congress from serving in the 
military reserves in violation of the Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress from 
holding another civil office, lacked standing); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633–34 (1937) (per 
curiam) (finding that plaintiffs who claimed that Justice Hugo Black’s Supreme Court 
nomination violated the Emoluments Clause—because Justice Black had been a senator when 
Congress voted to increase Supreme Court Justices’ retirement benefits—lacked standing); see 
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 70 (noting that standing is usually found when a litigant 
claims “a violation of an individual liberty” but not when a litigant claims “a violation of a 
constitutional provision dealing with the structure of government”). 
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II.  PUBLIC USE CLAIMS AS THIRD-PARTY GENERALIZED 
GRIEVANCES 
When a plaintiff challenges a taking on the ground that the taken 
property will not be used in a way that satisfies the Public Use Clause, 
that unconstitutional conduct has no relation to the plaintiff’s 
injury.113 Such a plaintiff shares that injury with every other citizen, 
and a suit to enjoin the taking on a public use ground is essentially a 
citizen suit of the kind that has been dismissed in other contexts. The 
discussion that follows expands on this argument and explores its 
logical corollary—that public use challenges such as Kelo and Lingle 
inherently share many essential features with cases that have been 
dismissed under the rule prohibiting third-party standing. 
The ban on generalized grievances prevents federal courts from 
hearing cases in which the alleged injury is “shared in substantially 
equal measure by all or a large class of citizens”114 and is designed to 
prevent federal courts from being used “to air . . . generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government.”115 Just because an 
injury happens to be widely shared, however, does not mean that a 
case presents a “generalized grievance,”116 and “standing is not to be 
denied simply because many people suffer the same injury.”117 In 
other words, the doctrine prohibits federal courts from hearing 
so-called “citizen suits,” in which a plaintiff seeks to vindicate “the 
right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the government be 
administered according to law and that the public moneys be not 
wasted.”118 Because such suits require courts to resolve questions that 
are “essentially matter[s] of public and not of individual concern,”119 
 
 113. See supra Part I. 
 114. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
 115. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 106 (1968)). 
 116. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 90 (“The term generalized grievance . . . 
[incorrectly] implies that no one would have standing to challenge a blatantly unconstitutional 
law applicable to everyone in the country.”). 
 117. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 687 (1973). 
 118. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (noting that “although a suitor may derive great comfort 
and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated . . . or that the Nation’s laws 
are faithfully enforced,” neither interest can be vindicated in federal court). 
 119. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). “The administration of any statute, 
likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers, the extent 
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this rule ensures that the judicial branch does not impinge upon the 
legislative and executive functions by deciding “‘abstract questions of 
wide public significance’ [that] amount to ‘generalized grievances,’ 
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches.”120 
The rationale for the ban on citizen suits is similar to that of the 
third-party standing doctrine—both seek to “prevent[] the judicial 
process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of 
the . . . interests of concerned bystanders”121—and the presence of one 
of these standing limitations often implicates the other.122 Under the 
third-party standing doctrine, a “plaintiff generally must assert his 
own legal rights and interests” rather than those of others not before 
the court,123 “even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects 
 
of whose several liability is indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public 
and not of individual concern.” Id. 
 120. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975)); see Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 179 (“In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate 
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the 
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”); Scalia, supra note 63, at 881–
82 (arguing that the prudential standing limitations are essential for ensuring that “the judicial 
[branch] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers” (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 1, 
art. 30)); cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The 
assumption that if [these plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a 
reason to find standing.”). 
 121. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687. 
 122. For example, although an environmental group’s suit to compel compliance with 
environmental law is an impermissible citizen suit because no “abstract, self-contained . . . ‘right’ 
to have the Executive observe the . . . law” exists, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
573 (1992), such a suit also seeks to vindicate the rights of directly affected third parties, namely, 
those who actually use or live near the threatened natural resources. Compare id. at 572 n.7 
(noting that the plaintiffs effectively sought “standing for persons who have no concrete 
interests affected—persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the country from the 
dam” (emphasis added)), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (“The alleged 
injury will be felt directly only by those who use Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, and 
for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the highway and 
ski resort.” (emphasis added)), with Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (granting standing to “environmental plaintiffs [who] . . . aver that 
they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the 
area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity” (emphasis added) (quoting Sierra Club, 405 
U.S. at 735)), and SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687 (“Here, [in] contrast [with Sierra Club], the appellees 
claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action . . . would directly harm them in their use of 
the natural resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area.” (emphasis added)). 
 123. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 83 
(4th ed. 2003) (“[A] plaintiff can assert only injuries that he or she has suffered . . . [and] cannot 
present the claims of third parties who are not part of the lawsuit.”). 
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the litigant also affects a third party.”124 Like the Article III 
justiciability requirements,125 the third-party standing doctrine helps 
to ensure the “concrete adverseness” that “sharpens the presentation 
of issues”126 upon which federal courts depend for effective 
constitutional adjudication because “third parties themselves usually 
will be the best proponents of their own rights.”127 More 
fundamentally, however, the third-party standing and citizen-suit 
doctrines both ensure that the judicial branch remains within its 
sphere of competence and constitutional authority.128 “Without such 
 
 124. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990). 
 125. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States “to all Cases” and 
“Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl.1. The five justiciability doctrines—standing, 
ripeness, mootness, the prohibition against advisory opinions, and the political question 
doctrine—are derived from Article III of the Constitution. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured 
Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 304 (1996). 
The Court has established particular tests for each of these justiciability doctrines, and the 
standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to show that an injury caused by the defendant is likely to 
be redressed by a favorable court decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Although the third-party 
standing doctrine is a prudential limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts, Kowalski v. 
Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004), the Court has treated the ban on citizen suits as a 
constitutional requirement. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court invalidated a citizen-
suit provision in the Endangered Species Act and implied that the “case-or-controversy 
requirement of Article III” prohibits Congress from authorizing citizen suits by statute. 504 U.S. 
at 560, 564, 575. See also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 209 (1992) (criticizing what he describes as 
“[b]y far the most important and novel holding in Lujan . . .[,] that Congress cannot grant 
standing to citizens”). More recently, however, the Court explained that the citizen-suit ban is 
“closely related to Art[icle] III . . . but essentially [a] matter[] of judicial self-governance.” Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 500 (1975)). Regardless of whether the ban on citizen suits is constitutional or prudential, 
its application by courts serves to limit the availability of judicial review for some constitutional 
clauses. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 (noting that dismissal as a citizen suit essentially 
renders the Statements and Accounts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, immune from judicial 
review). 
 126. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The value of “concreteness” may be 
questionable, however. “On the one hand, the Supreme Court has insisted on justiciability 
criteria that aim to make adjudication concrete, rather than abstract. On the other hand, it often 
relies upon abstract formalist reasoning to resolve cases on the merits, thereby gaining no 
benefit from the concrete context.” David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of 
Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 813–14 
(2004). Note that this observation may be less true for decisions on the merits in lower courts. 
 127. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976). But see Scalia, supra note 63, at 891 
(“Often the very best adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the 
American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the 
case, but no ‘concrete injury in fact’ whatever.”). 
 128. See Scalia, supra note 63, at 894–96 (“[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to 
their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals . . . and excludes them from the 
even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should function . . . .”); 
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limitations—closely related to Art[icle] III concerns but essentially 
matters of judicial self-governance—the courts would be called upon 
to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though 
other governmental institutions may be more competent to address 
the questions . . . .”129 
Despite these concerns about institutional competence and the 
role of the judicial branch, the Court has permitted third-party suits 
when two conditions are present. First, a plaintiff must have a “‘close’ 
relationship” to the third party whose rights the plaintiff is asserting, 
and second, some obstacle must prevent the third party from 
protecting her own interests.130 For example, in Gilmore v. Utah,131 
after a death row inmate voluntarily waived his right to appeal, the 
Court denied his mother standing to seek a stay of his execution 
because nothing prevented him from pursuing his claim in court.132 As 
Gilmore demonstrated, however, whether the parties themselves are 
closely related is irrelevant. Rather, the plaintiff’s interests must be 
closely aligned with those of the third party. 
Thus, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,133 a father 
alleging that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance 
violated the First Amendment was denied standing to sue his 
daughter’s school district.134 Although the same allegedly 
unconstitutional act—the school’s daily recital of the Pledge—injured 
both Newdow’s parental right to “inculcat[e] his child with his views 
 
cf. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 473 (1982) (“The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between the 
coequal arms of the National Government. The effect is, of course, most vivid when a federal 
court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch.”). 
 129. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). 
 130. Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); Singleton, 428 
U.S. at 114–16. The Court has emphasized that both these conditions must be present to allow 
third-party standing. See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30 (“[A] party seeking third-party standing 
[must] make [these] two . . . showings.”); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116 (“Even where the 
relationship is close, the reasons for requiring persons to assert their own rights . . . still apply.”); 
see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 447 (1998) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“While . . . [the] petitioner has a significant stake in challenging the statute and a 
close relationship with her father, she has not demonstrated a substantial hindrance to her 
father’s ability to assert his own rights.”). 
 131. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (per curiam). 
 132. Id. at 1017 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. (“[A death row inmate’s] access to the 
courts is entirely unimpeded and therefore a third party has no standing to litigate an Eighth 
Amendment claim—or indeed any other claim—on his behalf.”). 
 133. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 134. Id. at 4–5. 
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on religion” and his daughter’s First Amendment rights (had she 
wished to vindicate them),135 the Court viewed Newdow’s injury—and 
thus his standing—as deriving entirely from his relationship with his 
daughter.136 But because the Court believed that Newdow’s interest 
was “in many respects antagonistic” to the interests of his daughter—
she was not offended by the phrase “under God”137—the Court held 
that the rule against third-party standing prohibited his suit.138 
In Kelo and Lingle, the Court could plausibly have questioned 
the plaintiffs’ standing to enjoin a violation of the Public Use Clause, 
because that violation would not exist but for the injury suffered by 
other citizens qua citizens, who were unable to seek judicial relief. 
Moreover, the interests of plaintiffs who sue to enjoin a taking on the 
ground that it is not for a public use “are not parallel and, indeed, are 
potentially in conflict”139 with those of the public. For example, most 
New London residents presumably would support a plan to improve 
the city’s economy, create jobs, and increase tax revenues. Given that 
the success or failure of the redevelopment plan in Kelo has no 
bearing on the plaintiffs’ injuries,140 their interest in enjoining the plan 
entirely—based on a claim that the plan will in fact fail—conflicts 
with the public’s interest in the plan’s success. 
This conflict of interest is even more apparent in Lingle: a 
disgruntled consumer could not sue to enjoin a price-control 
regulation on the ground that the regulation would not actually lower 
prices.141 Citizens do not have standing to drag legislators who enact 
foolish laws into federal court, neither after an act’s ineffectiveness 
becomes apparent, nor beforehand, when reasonable people—and 
 
 135. Id. at 15. 
 136. All the Justices appeared to agree on this point. Compare id. (“Newdow’s standing 
derives entirely from his relationship with his daughter.”), with id. at 24 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“While she is intimately associated with the source of respondent’s 
standing (the father-daughter relationship and respondent’s rights thereunder), the daughter is 
not the source of respondent’s standing; instead it is their relationship that provides respondent 
his standing . . . .” (second emphasis added)). 
 137. Id. at 5, 15. The girl’s mother had informed the lower court that “her daughter is a 
Christian who believes in God and has no objection either to reciting or hearing others recite 
the Pledge of Allegiance.” Id. at 10. 
 138. Id. at 13–18. 
 139. Id. at 15. 
 140. See supra notes 7–16 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 17–27 and accompanying text. 
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even reasonable economists—still disagree about its impact.142 The 
only remedy available to such a consumer would be to lobby for a 
more effective regulation or to support the campaigns of 
economically astute legislators in the next election. In Lingle, 
Chevron wanted to enjoin the rent cap entirely,143 whereas consumers 
presumably wanted gasoline price regulations that actually lowered 
prices at the pump. Imagine that gasoline consumers decided to lobby 
for more effective gas price controls while Chevron simultaneously 
sought relief in federal court. Such consumers, who are directly 
harmed by the rent cap’s ineffectiveness, would be seeking relief from 
the legislature while Chevron, whose injury bears no relation to the 
act’s effectiveness, would be bringing its claims before the court.144 
The proposition that cases such as Lingle and Kelo could have 
been dismissed for lack of standing is counterintuitive and has never 
been a factor in the Court’s takings decisions, which in the public-use 
context do not even mention standing. The Court’s standing cases 
have often been criticized for drawing arbitrary distinctions,145 and the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts used standing in a way that suggests a 
skepticism of certain types of claims.146 Taking that criticism one step 
further, the fact that standing issues tend to be raised in connection 
with environmental claims,147 rather than in connection with property 
 
 142. The district court reached its decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. by evaluating 
the testimony of two expert economists, one for Chevron and one for Hawaii. 125 S. Ct. 2078, 
2084 (2005). 
 143. See id. at 2084 (“Chevron’s claim is simply that Hawaii’s rent cap will not actually serve 
the State’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers against high gasoline prices.”). 
 144. See id. (“The owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a 
legitimate interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property 
subject to an ineffective regulation.”); see supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
 145. See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1324–25 (1995) (discussing the Court’s notable standing decisions 
and commenting that many seem irreconcilable with the others); Sunstein, supra note 125, at 
209 (claiming that the distinction to forbid a citizen suit is “quite a stretch”); cf. Covington v. 
Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring) (“A theory that 
‘injury to all is injury to none’ seems wrong in theory, for it would deny standing to every citizen 
such that no matter how badly the whole may be hurt, none of the parts could ever have 
standing to go to court to cure a harmful violation.”). 
 146. See Stearns, supra note 145, at 1326–27 (noting that although the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts used standing in ways consistent with social-choice theory, the doctrine was first created 
to “stave off unwelcome challenges to New Deal regulatory programs”). 
 147. See Weinberg, supra note 111, at 27 (explaining that “standing . . . is often a major 
[issue]” in the “numerous actions brought by concerned citizens and environmental advocacy 
organizations to . . . enjoin harmful activities”). 
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claims,148 itself indicates a systemic bias in favor of property rights,149 
stemming in part from the axiomatic status of property rights in the 
American constitutional tradition.150 
In few takings cases has a Justice explicitly suggested that a 
consistent application of the Court’s standing jurisprudence might 
 
 148. An interesting counterexample is Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), in which 
several property owners sued the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) under the 
citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000), to 
enjoin the FWS from taking certain actions to protect two species of endangered fish, Bennett, 
520 U.S. at 159–60. The plaintiffs alleged that they would suffer economic loss to their property, 
but the lower courts denied standing because the plaintiffs’ claims were not within the “zone of 
interests” protected by the ESA, finding that “only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the 
preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA.” Id. at 
161 (quoting Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court reversed 
in a unanimous decision and granted the plaintiffs standing. Id. at 164–66. The Court held that 
because the “zone of interests” test was a prudential bar to standing, Congress could—and did 
in the ESA—legislatively circumvent it. Id. at 161–66. Bennett serves as an interesting contrast 
to Lujan, in which plaintiffs were denied standing to sue to prevent the government from 
engaging in conduct that would allegedly injure endangered species. Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63, 578 (1992); see infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. For a 
discussion of the significance of Bennett, see generally Robert S. Nix, Comment, Bennett v. 
Spear: Justice Scalia Oversees the Latest “Battle” in the “War” Between Property Rights and 
Environmentalism, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 745 (1997). 
 149. The Court’s opinion of statutes containing citizen-suit provisions is exemplified by the 
assumption that “plaintiffs seeking to enforce theses statutes as private attorneys general 
[allege] injuries [that] are ‘noneconomic’ and probably noncompensable.” Middlesex County 
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). In Pennell v. City of San 
Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), one of the few cases to question the standing of a takings plaintiff, the 
Court considered whether landlords had standing to challenge the validity of a rent-control 
ordinance that had never been applied to their properties, id. at 6–7. Although the Court 
conceded that “it is speculative” whether the ordinance would injure any of the plaintiffs, the 
Court found standing because “application of the constitutional standing requirement [is not] a 
mechanical exercise.” Id. at 6–7 (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751 (1984)). Of course, the Court’s standing jurisprudence in environmental cases has been 
criticized as precisely that—an overly formal mechanical exercise. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for “demand[ing] what is likely an empty 
formality” when, to demonstrate a sufficiently imminent injury for standing, the Court requires 
that plaintiffs allege a “description of concrete plans” to return to a region whose environment 
is allegedly threatened by the challenged conduct). 
 150. In this vein, Professor Laura Underkuffler explains a “hidden rationale” running 
through the Court’s takings cases: 
[T]he conception of property as a ‘right’ which ‘protects’ is driven by the underlying 
assumption that the case involves the assertion of the highly prized values associated 
with property against those of an unrelated (and lesser-valued) public interest. We 
assume that the core values, which the individual interest asserts, are presumptively 
superior to the core values that the competing public interest involves. 
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 36, at 156. Whether the Takings Clause in fact elevates such 
presumptions to constitutional status is questionable. See supra notes 31 and 104–09 and 
accompanying text. 
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deny standing to a takings plaintiff. In Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council,151 the Court held that a regulation to prevent coastal 
erosion was a taking because it denied the plaintiff all “economically 
viable use of his land.”152 Justice Blackmun noted, in his vehement 
dissent, that if the principles the Court had enunciated several days 
earlier in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife153 were to be applied 
consistently, then the plaintiff in Lucas should be denied standing.154 
The Lujan plaintiffs sued, under the Endangered Species Act, to 
prevent the construction of a dam that they alleged would harm 
protected species.155 The plaintiffs had visited the vicinity, observed 
various threatened species in their natural habitat, and intended to 
visit again. The Court, however, denied standing because “‘some day’ 
intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even 
any specification of when the some day w[ould] be—d[id] not support 
a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that [the Court’s] cases 
require[d].”156 Justice Blackmun, quoting this language, pointed out 
that the same problem was present in Lucas: the plaintiff “failed to 
demonstrate any immediate concrete plans to build or sell.”157 In 
other words, the plaintiff should have been denied standing because 
 
 151. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 152. Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
 153. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 154. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 155. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563. 
 156. Id. at 564. Five years after Lujan was decided, Justice Scalia discussed the citizen-suit 
provision of the ESA in surprisingly broad, inclusive terms: 
[The ESA] says that ‘any person may commence a civil suit’—an authorization of 
remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress ordinarily uses. . . . 
Our readiness to take the term ‘any person’ at face value is greatly augmented by two 
interrelated considerations: that the overall subject matter of this legislation is the 
environment (a matter in which it is common to think all persons have an interest) 
and that the obvious purpose of the particular provision in question is to encourage 
enforcement by so-called ‘private attorneys general’ . . . . Given these factors, we 
think the conclusion of expanded standing . . . to the full extent permitted under 
Article III [is warranted]. 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–66 (1997) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2000)); see also 
supra note 148. This language from Bennett is less surprising when viewed in context—in sharp 
contrast to Lujan, the plaintiffs in Bennett were owners of private property seeking to enjoin the 
government’s conduct to prevent an economic injury to their private property. Bennett, 520 U.S. 
at 159–60. In Lujan, the plaintiffs sought to prevent damage to the environment, which is, of 
course, the express purpose of the ESA. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559 (noting that the action was 
filed by an organization “dedicated to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes”). 
Nevertheless, unlike the plaintiffs in Lujan, the plaintiffs in Bennett were accorded standing. 
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164–66. 
 157. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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the alleged injury depended on his “‘[s]ome day’ intentions” to use 
the property.158 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the plaintiffs had standing in Lujan and its ilk159 on the 
one hand, and Lucas—or for that matter Kelo and Lingle—on the 
other, is beside the point. Rather, the fact that standing is central to 
the inquiry in Lujan but not even discussed in Lucas is emblematic of 
how the property paradigm intrinsic in the constitutional order colors 
the development of a procedural doctrine such as standing.160 The 
disparity between the characterizations of the Public Use and 
General Welfare Clauses is another manifestation of how jurists’ 
thinking about property pervades the interpretation of seemingly 
unrelated constitutional clauses.161 According to the conventional 
wisdom, the United States in the first century following the 
Revolutionary War was a “quintessentially Lockean” society 
exemplified by economic individualism and vested natural rights162 in 
which the law’s primary purpose was to ensure that private property 
 
 158. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)). 
 159. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
173, 183 (2000) (finding standing to sue under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2005), for 
discharge into a river); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 105 (1998) (finding 
no standing to sue a company for violations of a statute that required companies to report the 
presence of toxic chemicals); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64 (finding no standing to sue to prevent 
development that would allegedly injure endangered species); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 
U.S. 871, 881–82, 886–89, 900 (1990) (finding no standing to challenge mining on federal lands 
by plaintiffs who used only a small part of affected lands); United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687–90 (1973) (finding standing to 
challenge a federal policy that would allegedly decrease the nation’s air quality); Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 735, 741 (1972) (finding no standing under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005), to sue to enjoin development in part of the Sequoia 
National Forest). 
 160. The effect of Lujan’s requirement of a “concrete and particularized” injury is that 
“very ‘old’—traditional common law—property is . . . ‘more owned,’ so far as the federal courts 
are concerned,” than is “new” property created by statutory entitlement programs. Robert 
Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 65–66 & n.194 (2005). 
Analogously, “the U.S. Supreme Court’s ‘takings’ jurisprudence . . . appears to be bringing 
greater security to ‘old’ property even against democratically decided actions by the state, [such 
that] traditional assets definitely look to be increasingly ‘asset-like’” relative to statutory 
entitlement programs, id. at 65–66 n.195, not to mention relative to public rights such as 
environmental rights. 
 161. See supra notes 64–71, 110–112 and accompanying text. 
 162. See NOVAK, supra note 31, at 6 (“Nineteenth-century political ideology . . . was 
quintessentially Lockean, suffused with a passion for private rights and predestined for market 
capitalism.”). 
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owners retained “virtually uncontrolled dominion over the use and 
disposition of [their] property.”163 Although subsequent scholarship 
has shed considerable doubt on the accuracy of this assessment,164 it 
continues to hold sway for many165 and has contributed to the 
development of standing as an obstacle to vindicating interests not 
predicated on traditional property rights.166 To be sure, the Court has 
repeatedly stated that aesthetic and environmental injuries stand on 
equal footing with economic injuries: “Aesthetic and environmental 
well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the 
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular 
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few 
does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the 
judicial process.”167 If the Court is to be taken at its word, however, 
then perhaps it ought not require plaintiffs alleging the former to 
meet formalistic standing requirements while it assumes that plaintiffs 
alleging the latter automatically meet those requirements. 
 
 163. Scheiber, supra note 31, at 221 (alteration in original) (quoting B. SCHWARTZ, A 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S., PART III: THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 231 
(1965)); see EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 16 (“The Lockean system was dominant at the time when 
the Constitution was adopted . . . , and the protection of property against its enemies was a 
central and recurrent feature of the political thought of the day.”); HORWITZ, supra note 31, at 
31 (“In the eighteenth century, the right to property had been the right to absolute dominion 
over land . . . .”). 
 164. See, e.g., Scheiber, supra note 31, at 231 (“We find, therefore, no historical monolith 
that bespeaks a single-minded devotion to the sacred rights of private property.”); see also 
ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 36–42 (discussing the limitations on traditional private property 
rights that Jefferson and others advocated to achieve various ends for society); NOVAK, supra 
note 31, at 6 (detailing the breadth and depth of nineteenth-century regulation of private 
property and the extent that the resultant infringement on property rights was generally 
accepted); cf. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 7–9 (1956) 
(exploring and reassessing “the myth of our laissez faire past”). 
 165. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT 
RIGHTS 41, 58–60 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1963) (arguing that the Takings Clause provides no 
leeway for courts to balance its proscription against the public interest); cf. JOHN BRIGHAM, 
PROPERTY AND THE POLITICS OF ENTITLEMENT 7 (1990) (“[T]he right wing in the legal 
academy has been intellectually provocative in its arguments that . . . the . . . Takings Clause 
provide[s] a basis for dismantling the welfare state.”). 
 166. See supra notes 145–58 and accompanying text. 
 167. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)); see also Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (“Of course, the desire to use or observe an 
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for 
purpose of standing.”). 
